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INTRODUCTION
Bhopal, India - December 3, 1984
Roughly forty metric tons of methyl isocyanate ("MIC"), an
irrespirable gas used to create pesticides, leaked out of its holding tank at
the Union Carbide plant.1 As a result of the accident, thousands died
within days, and thousands more suffered long term health effects.
Union Carbide claimed that a disgruntled worker sabotaged the MIC
tanks by filling them with water, which caused the chemical to turn into a
deadly gas and escape.2 However, Indian courts believed otherwise and
issued criminal arrest warrants after finding that Union Carbide's
* *J.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law, expected 2007. B.A. in
History and German, Davidson College, 2001. Many thanks to Professor
Edgardo Rotman, Foreign and International Law Librarian and Senior Lecturer
in International & Comparative Law, University of Miami, for his help and
support in researching and writing this paper.
' D.R. Varma, The Bhopal Accident and Methyl Isocyanate Toxicity, 40 J.
TOXICOL. ENVIRON. HEALTH 513, 513 (Dec. 1993).
2 Jackson B. Browning, Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal in CRISIS RESPONSE:
INSIDE STORIES ON MANAGING UNDER SEIGE 1 (Jack Gottschalk ed., 1993),
available at http://bhopal.com/pdfsfbrowning.pdf (last visited February 27,
2006).
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management encouraged too many shortcuts on safety with the intent to
reduce costs.
3
Tenasserim Region, Mvanmar - early 1990's
During construction of the Yadana gas pipeline, Burmese
villagers accused American oil giant Unocal of aiding and abetting
human rights violations carried out by Myanmar's military government
for Unocal's benefit.4  Allegations included the use of violence and
intimidation, destruction or relocation of villages, mass rape, murder, and
slave labor.5 Unocal denied the allegations, but argued that even if the
oil giant knew of the human rights abuses, it could not be held liable in
United States courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
6
United States - 1996
Kathy Lee Gifford, a popular daytime talk-show host and
advocate of children's rights, found herself embroiled in a sweatshop
scandal when Charles Kernaghan of the National Labor Committee
Education Fund in Support of Worker and Human Rights in Central
America told the United States by way of Congress that Ms. Gifford's
clothing line, made for and controlled by Wal-Mart, was manufactured
by girls barely in their teens in a Honduras sweatshop. 7 This served as a
lesson for celebrities with clothing lines that they had to monitor the
manufacture of their products or face the court of public opinion.
8
3 Chemical Industry Archives on the Bhopal disaster,
http://www.chemicalindustryarchives.org/dirtysecrets/bhopal/index.asp (last
visited February 27, 2006).
4 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
5 For an overview of the allegations, court proceedings and outcome, see
EarthRights International, Historic Advance for Universal Human Rights:
Unocal to Compensate Burmese Villagers (April 2, 2005), at
http://www.earthrights.org/content/view/189/56/ (last visited February 27,
2006).
6 Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 889-90.
7 Stephanie Strom, A Sweetheart Becomes Suspect; Looking Behind Those
Kathie Lee Labels, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996, at D1.
8 The Olsen twins nearly became the next Kathie Lee-Gifford in their own
clothing line deal with Wal-Mart. See Taking a Stand Against Sweatshops; On
the Line; Brief Article, THE PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1, 2005, at 18 (reporting that
after a protest organized by the National Labor Committee, the Olsen twins
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Despite universal condemnation of human rights9 abuses by the
civilized nations of the world, nearly sixty years of work by the United
Nations to end such behavior, and the work of literally hundreds of
watchdog groups, the three above examples evidence that human rights
violations still occur. However, state actors did not perpetuate the Union
Carbide, Unocal, and Gifford abuses; rather, multinational corporations
generated these abuses ("MNCs"'°). Large, wealthy and powerful, these
world-wide corporations have become the new poster-children of
international human rights violations. In response to the abuses
committed by MNCs, the federal court system in the United States, the
United Nations, and even MNCs themselves have begun to craft
solutions.
Yet policing MNCs is not simply a matter of disciplining
corporations because they often cannot act alone. Since MNCs require
the acquiescence of the state in order to operate, a state that does not
demand that an MNC obey labor or environmental laws may be in breach
of its traditional duty to uphold the law and protect its citizens. This can
occur in countries that lack the legal infrastructure necessary to monitor
the corporations." A major factor of this inability is the fact that many
MNCs have revenues far greater than the countries in which they
operate.' 2 MNCs desire the cheap labor that a developing nation offers, 3
signed a pledge to grant maternity leave to women working in sweatshops
producing the Olsens' clothing line).
9 There are various violations of international law. The author will use the
phrase "human rights" to denote many kinds of rights, such as cultural rights,
economic rights, labor rights, etc. Violation of all such rights by MNCs may
amount to violations of international law.
'0 Although the terms themselves vary, there are different names for a
multinational corporation with identical meanings: Transnational Corporation
(TNC), Transnational Enterprise (TNE), and Multinational Enterprise (MNE).
The use of Multinational Corporation (MNC) is simply the author's preference.
" Sukanya Pillay, And Justice for All? Globalization, Multinational
Corporations, and the Needfor Legally Enforceable Human Rights Protections,
81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 489, 501 (2004).
12 ROBERT F. GORMAN, GREAT DEBATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FIFTY KEY ISSUES 242 (2001). In 2001, for example, of the
100 top economies in the world, 51 were not nation-states, but corporations.
Global Issues Rise of the Corporation,
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and the developing nation needs the capital that MNCs bring to the
country, which allows it to grow and diversify its economy.14 This
financial gap often acts as a "trumping leverage" in their relationship,'
5
resulting in the lack of oversight.
MNCs often act as accomplices of the state, or even the lone
instigators, in acts resulting in human rights abuses. For example, MNCs
in the extraction (mining) industry are "particularly prone to associate
with egregious [government] violators of human rights," because, as
Saman Zia-Zafiri explains, "[MNCs] have to dig for resources where
they find them, typically in the developing world, where the resource is
one of the main sources of income for the government."' 6 As a result of
both the MNC and the government looking for profit, local populations
often suffer dislocation, destruction of their environment and property,
death, mutilation, rape or other human rights abuses.
17
The scope of this paper consists of industry, national (U.S.), and
international methods of regulating or enforcing the conduct of private
multinational corporations abroad. Part I defines a MNC and then
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Corporations/Rise.asp (last visited
February 27, 2006).
13 Pauline Abadie, A New Story of David and Goliath: The Alien Tort Claims Act
Give Victims of Environmental Injustice in the Developing World a Viable
Claim Against Multinational Corporations, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 745,
745-746 (2004).
14 GORMAN, supra note 12, at 242-43.
15 Pillay, supra note 11, at 500.
16 Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating
International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81-83 (1999).
17 Such a situation occurred in Nigeria, a country rich with oil, but with a
depraved military government. During the early 1990's, when the military
government controlled the country, it granted the Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
(operating in conjunction with Shell Transport) extraction rights to remove
Nigeria's oil. When members of the local Ogoni tribe organized to protest
Shell's theft and destruction of their land, the Nigerian government, allegedly at
the behest of Shell, arrested, tortured, and executed members of the Ogoni
resistance, including its leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (The subject matter of this case
lies in a forum non conveniens action; however, the court delves into the




tackles the question of whether or not MNCs should be held accountable
for human rights violations. Part II deals with the voluntary codes of
conduct promulgated either by the MNC itself, its industry, or by a non-
government organization ("NGO"). Part III looks specifically at the
Alien Tort Claims Act ("the Act"), a now frequently used tool to hold
MNCs accountable for their actions. The discussion covers how the Act
came to be used against MNCs, whether it is an effective tool for that
purpose, and the future of litigation under the Act. Part IV examines the
efforts of the United Nations to try to regulate the conduct of MNCs with
a binding code of conduct. At the end, in Part V, I hope to paint a picture
of the effectiveness of these three methods and offer suggestions on how
to make them each more effective, both alone and in conjunction with
each other.
1. WHAT ARE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND SHOULD THEY
BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS?
Multinational corporations are entities "that do business in
several countries through branches and subsidiaries located in countries"
throughout the world (often in developing states) with their headquarters
based in highly industrialized states. 18 The concept of a MNC is not new
as its origin lies in the long period of colonization of the New World,
Africa, the Near East, and the Far East by Western nations. The British
East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, and Hudson's Bay
Company are prime examples of early MNCs controlled by the
colonizing state.' 9 The modern MNC emerged after World War II, when
the goal of rebuilding a world torn asunder by war offered private
business firms unparallel opportunities to expand their operations
abroad.20 Developing countries also encouraged MNCs to invest in order
to bring in a capital flow of money, to cultivate resources for
development, and to diversify their economies. 2 1  MNCs
18 EDMUND JAN OSMANCZYK, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, 1495 (Anthony Mango ed., 3d ed. 2003).
19 Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443, 453 (2001).
20 GORMAN, supra note 12, at 242.
21 Id. at 242-43.
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characteristically have large amounts of physical and monetary resources
and an ability to move funds from one currency to another as they
please.22 They may even be much wealthier than the nation in which
they operate, often a concern of not only that nation, but of the UN and
other world trade bodies as well.23
As a corporation, an MNC is neither a state nor an individual.
Since traditionally only states and state actors are held liable for human
rights abuses, the debate about MNC violations of human rights must
begin with whether or not they should have responsibilities under
international law. There exist several arguments for not extending
responsibility for human rights to MNCs:
" They are businesses. As such their only real social
responsibility is to benefit their shareholders, not to be moral
arbiters on human rights issues;
* As non-state actors, they have no obligation to observe
human rights, but only to obey the law of the country in
which they operate;
* Question of which human rights corporations should
observe. Corporations as they operate can ensure that they
do not infringe on their employees' economic and cultural
rights, but they can do nothing to protect their civil or
political rights since that is the government's job; and
* The "free-rider" problem: Morally conscious companies
disadvantage themselves competitively by spending the time
and effort it takes to observe human rights, while their less
scrupulous counterparts do not even bother. Also, these
scrupulous companies may either be unable or unwilling to
work in countries with questionable human rights records.
24
22 S. Prakash Sethi, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Success of
Globalization, in GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHO MUST DELIVER ON HUMAN
RIGHTS? 205, 207 (Andrew Kuper, ed., 2005).
23 GORMAN, supra note 12, at 242.
24 Peter T. Muchlinski, Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?,
77 INT'L AFF. 31, at 35-36 (2001).
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Many states have also been reluctant to hold MNCs liable for
abuses committed abroad because to do so would require them to
"recognize the full international legal personality of corporations" and
thus put the corporations "on equal terms with states and [allows them
to] claim rights under international law. 25
Yet the MNC has responsibilities in the area of human rights for
several compelling reasons. First, MNCs play an increasingly greater
role in the economies of developing countries, which sometimes creates
monopoly-like power that they use to control local manufacturers and the
working conditions of their employees.26  Also, many developing
countries willingly "allow MNCs to own or manage projects in key
public sectors, such as energy, telecommunications, transport, water, and
,,27sanitation, in essence giving them some of the power of a state.
Moreover, many corporations agree that they have human rights
responsibilities. Unocal (discussed in more detail later in this paper)
professes it "believes that we have a responsibility to society, especially
in relation to the impact of our operations. All employees must respect
the human rights and dignity of others."28 Even Enron, before its demise,
publicly stated, "[w]e do not and will not tolerate mistreatment or human
rights abuses of any kind by our employees or contractors. ' 29 The
commonplace thinking today appears to be that MNCs do have human
rights responsibilities, and this paper treats them as if they do.
25 Alex Wawryk, Regulating Transnational Corporations Through Corporate
Codes of Conduct, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 55
(Jedrzej George Frynas and Scott Pegg, eds., 2003).
26 Sethi, supra note 22, at 207.
27 Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes to the Next Level, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 398 (2005).
28 Unocal Code of Conduct,
http://www.unocal.com/uclcodeofconduct/ethics/labor.htm (last visited
February 27, 2006).
29 Enron Press Room,
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/responsibility/human-rightsstatement.h
tml (last visited February27, 2006).
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II. CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
What is a corporate code of conduct? In general terms, codes are
"policy statements that outline the ethical standards of conduct to which
a corporation adheres., 30 They can be thought of as "public welfare"
codes, implemented not to facilitate private business transactions or to
maximize profits, but rather, at least in the MNC context, to "promote
socially responsible... conduct, largely in the developing world, so as to
prevent harm or mistreatments of persons by MNC operations.'
Practically all MNCs in business today have adopted a code of conduct,
32
as the 1990's saw a "cascade" of company codes come into place,
prompted mostly by revelations of MNC misconduct in developing areas
like Burma, Nigeria and parts of Asia.33 Codes of conduct are not really
"soft law" but voluntary behavioral guidelines that MNCs pledge
themselves to abide by because they see it in their interests to do so (in
terms of business strategy34 and keeping away bad publicity35) and are
the preferable alternative to legislatures forcing a code upon them.
MNC codes of conduct come in roughly four varieties: 36 publicinternational codes of conduct (discussed in Part IV); private company
30 Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U.
INT'L. L.J. 309, 322 (2004).
31 Murphy, supra note 27, at 393-94.
32 Tara J. Radin, The Effectiveness of Global Codes of Conduct: Role Models
That Make Sense, 109 (4) Bus. & SOCIETY R. 415, 420-21 (2004).
33 Rob van Tulder & Ans Kolk, Multinationality and Corporate Ethics: Codes of
Conduct in the Sporting Goods Industry, 32 J. Int'l Bus. Studies 267, 268
(2001).
34 See e.g., Chiquita, Corporate Responsibility,
http://www.chiquita.com/chiquita/nitro.asp?category=corpres&file=corpresmen
u.asp (last visited February 27, 2006) (stating "Corporate Responsibility at
Chiquita is an integral part of our global business strategy. It commits us to
operate in a socially responsible way everywhere we do business . . . [and to
build] a stronger and more financially successful Company.").
35 See e.g., Ethan B. Kapstein, The Corporate Ethics Crusade, 80 Foreign Aff.
105 (2001) (stating that NGOs and the media exert enormous pressure using bad
publicity to get MNCs to change - and it works, although Kapstein is not sure
such a strategy actually helps those abused by MNCs.).
36 Wawryk, supra note 25, at 53, 59, 64, 69.
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codes of conduct; industry association codes of conduct; and non-
government organization (NGO) codes of conduct. Many scholars see
these codes as an effective, even successful way to control MNC
behavior,37 while others see them as mere diversions, media ploys with
no substance behind them or teeth to ensure compliance.38 We shall
examine each in turn.
Private company codes of conduct are the most common kind of
code, since they are created by the MNCs themselves. Implementing an
individual MNC code has considerable advantages for the organization.
First, the MNC can personalize its own code, taking into account the
needs of its employees, its business and its industry. Second, the costs of
creation and implementation are lower than the costs of drafting an
instrument of international or national law. 39  Third, well-drafted
corporate codes that are consistent with international law have a certain
moral persuasion,40 which will influence other MNCs to follow their
example.41 Finally, a voluntarily adopted code may indicate that the
MNC has recognized that its long-term viability is linked to its social
responsibilities, which will make successful adherence to the code much
more likely.
42
An effective code should contain certain features including
continuing training and awareness procedures for all members of the
company about code implementation; an internal monitoring procedure
that requires management to report their findings and make surprise
visits to work sites; independent third-party monitoring that includes
monitoring any sub-contractors; an anonymous "hotline" that employees
and locals can use to report code violations; sanctions for not following
43the code; and arrangements to change/modify the code when necessary.
Despite the necessity of these features, most MNC codes have no such
provisions, instead they outline general principles rather than concrete
methods to ensure compliance with international law. Nike's code of
37 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 32.
38 See Sethi, supra note 22, at 212-13.
39 Wawryk, supra note 25, at 61.
40 /d. at 62.
41 See Radin, supra note 32, at 421.
42 Wawryk, supra note 25, at 61.43 Id. at 60-61.
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conduct is an excellent example. 4 Nike promises that it will not allow
its overseas contractors to use forced labor or child labor, will make sure
its contractors pay all their employees at least the minimum wage (for
that country), and will ensure that its contractors have environmental
policies and standards in place.45 All excellent goals, but nowhere does
the code describe any kind of monitoring system to effectuate them.
Neither does the code mention possible sanctions for violations, nor does
it list any methods for reporting violations. Nike's code, full of
wonderful aspirations, falls short on the particulars that would ensure
compliance.
The Levi Strauss and Co. code, however, offers a good example
of an effective code consisting of a set of specific principles with some
teeth to back them up.46 It has essentially the same goals as Nike's, but
the Levi code provides for sanctions if one of Levi's overseas contractors
fails to comply with its provisions. For example, when Levi discovers a
violation, it asks the contractor "to implement a corrective action plan
within a specified time period," and if the contractor does not comply,
then "Levi Strauss & Co. will terminate the business relationship.'
4 7
Practically all MNCs, however, do not reveal whom they use as their
overseas suppliers. 48 Levi, however, has published a list of all their
suppliers so others can verify that the company is following its code.49
Without such a list, a sanction like Levi's cannot be effective since no
one could verify that the MNC has lived up to its obligations. As Levi
Strauss & Co. shows, if an MNC gives teeth to its code and makes
verification of its enforcement possible, then the code can be effective.
Industry association codes of conduct are much like their private
company counterparts, except they belong to an entire industry or group
of companies within the same industry. Such codes are typically




visited February 27, 2006).
47 Id.
48 Sethi, supra note 22, at 213.





voluntary, as the MNC does not need to adopt them; however, some
industry associations condition membership on adoption of, and
compliance with, their respective codes. 50 An example of such a code
requiring adoption is "Responsible Care" which regulates health, safety
and environmental issues for the chemical industry.5 Other industry
codes, however, do not require adoption to join. These codes have
provisions particular to the industry that a company can adopt as its own.
One example is the Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC).52
EICC 'participants' do not need to verify that the MNC has complied
with the code.
An offshoot of these industry codes are Rugmark 53 and "dolphin-
safe tuna." 54 These are not codes per se, but rather seals of approval.
For Rugmark, a rug sold with the Rugmark symbol certifies that the rug
was not made with child labor. For "dolphin-safe tuna," the mark
certifies that fishing techniques used did not allow dolphins to be caught
in the tuna nets.
NGO codes are those created by organizations with interests in
labor, environmental, religious and human rights, usually in response to a
significant incident of MNC misconduct. For example, the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economics created the CERES Principles
in response to the Exxon-Valdes oil spill of 1989. 55 These codes are
non-specific, as they do not detail what an MNC can and cannot do in
50 Wawryk, supra note 25, at 64.
5' Responsible Care homepage: http://www.responsiblecare-us.com/ (last
visited February 27, 2006).
52 EICC, version 2.0 October 2005,
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supcode.pdf (last
visited February 27, 2006). EICC code 'participants' include Hewlett-Packard,
IBM, Dell, Microsoft and Intel.
53 http://www.rugmark.org/about/cert.htm (last visited February 27, 2006).
54 http://www.earthtrust.org/fsa.html (last visited February 27, 2006).
55 Ceres Principles, http://www.ceres.org/ceres/ (last visited February 27, 2006).
Other NGO codes include the Clean Clothes Campaign for the apparel industry,
http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/ccccode.htm#ii (last visited February 27,
2006); the Sunshine Standards promulgated by the Stakeholders Alliance,
http://www.stakeholderalliance.org/sunstds.html (last visited February 27,
2006); and the Forest Stewardship Council for the lumber industry,
http://www.fscus.org/standards-criteria/ (last visited February 27, 2006).
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their daily operations, but rather, they set out series of principles or goals
around which the MNC is supposed to craft its own code. For example,
CERES principle number five deals with risk reduction, stating merely:
"We [insert MNC] will strive to minimize the environmental, health and
safety risks to our employees and the communities in which we operate
through safe technologies, facilities and operating procedures, and by
being prepared for emergencies.
' 56
The most famous of the NGO codes is the Global Sullivan
Principles, crafted in 1977 by Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, who accepted a
position on the GM board of directors to continue the fight for civil
rights in the U.S. in the corporate setting.57 However, South Africa
turned out to be his focus of his work due to the increased public
criticism of MNCs, including GM, and the companies' apparent
compliance with the official policy of apartheid.58 Sullivan created a set
of principles that grew into an international standard of conduct for
companies of all stripes, and since then more than a dozen MNCs
announced their commitment in following the Global Sullivan Principles,
including Chevron, GM and Proctor and Gamble.59 Unocal professes to
follow Rev. Sullivan's principles and states that its own code of conduct
"aligns well" with them.60
Like the codes discussed above, NGO codes are voluntary, but
once an MNC adopts an NGO code the company must agree to
compliance montoring by the NGO.61  Despite the mantle of
respectability that comes with NGO codes, most of them do not attract
MNC support.62 It is cheaper for MNCs to create their own codes and to
56 Ceres Principles, http://www.ceres.org/coalitionandcompanies/principles.php
(last visited February 27, 2006).
57 Global Sullivan Principles,
http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/endorsement/history/default.asp (last
visited February 27, 2006).
58 id.
59 Id.
60 Unocal Code of Conduct - Guiding Principles,
http://www.unocal.com/ucl_code of conduct/guidingprinciples.htm (last
visited February 27, 2006).
61 See Wawryk, supra note 25, at 69. The Global Sullivan Principles, however,
contain no such provision.
62 Id. at 71.
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conduct their own monitoring, if they bother to monitor at all. NGOs
also have a tendency to fall prey to anti-MNC bias, which makes the
MNCs suspicious of NGOs' reasons for getting involved in formulating
codes.63
Private company codes, industry association codes, and NGO
codes generally share the same strengths and weaknesses. They can be
effective if they are specific, contain appropriate sanctions, and followed
by a company with an interest in abiding by its provisions. The
voluntary nature of these codes will always cast suspicion on their
effectiveness, but where nation's laws or leaders cannot or will not
uphold human rights, codes are the best method to get MNCs to maintain
acceptable human rights standards.
III. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Since nation-states traditionally are held liable for violations of
international law, it reasons that a plaintiff could bring a state to court to
punish it for such violations. Yet a plaintiff cannot do that in American
courts for two reasons: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
64
and the Act of State Doctrine. First, FSIA confers immunity onto a
foreign state by removing the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction
unless an enumerated exception applies.65 In the context of MNC human
rights litigation, one of those exceptions could occur if the plaintiff can
show that a foreign state's activities fall within the commercial activity
exception. 66  Nevertheless, even if the plaintiff can demonstrate
commercial activity, there is still the Act of State Doctrine, a judicially
created device that prohibits the federal courts from examining the
validity of a foreign sovereign's actions performed inside the foreign
state, regardless of whether the acts violated international law.67 The Act
of State Doctrine works to maintain the separation of powers as the
63 Ratner, supra note 19, at 533.
64 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
65 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994).
66 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
67 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
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judiciary should not interfere with the executive's role in foreign
relations and diplomacy.
68
Such a hurdle, however, does not exist in the context of MNCs
because the plaintiff may be able bring his claim under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (the Act). 69 Also known as the Alien Tort Statute, the Act is
a jurisdictional statute which ostensibly allows one or more foreign
individuals to file a civil tort claim against one or more foreign or
domestic defendants if the defendant(s) can be properly served inside the
United States. A mere sentence long, the Act states: "[tihe district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." The elements of an ATCA claim are thus simple: "(1) a
claim by an alien, (2) alleging a tort, and (3) a violation of international
law."
,70
The simplicity of the Act means little, however, because use of
the Act to punish MNCs for violations of international law has evoked
very strong reactions. For some, the Act represents "a uniquely powerful
tool for seeking redress [in the U.S] from corporations violating basic
international standards of behavior," because there exists a
"jurisdictional lacuna where the corporation is not subject to any law" as
the "host government will not upbraid the foreign MNC for actions that
the [host] government [itself] is involved in" and the home government's
courts "are unlikely to engage in extraterrestrial control., 71 For others,
however, claims brought under the Act "could plausibly culminate in a
nightmare" scenario in which litigation would "spin out of control" to
such an extent it would disrupt international trade, United States foreign
72relations, and turn into an international version of asbestos litigation.
In short, a commercial, international and judicial mess would ensue. To
understand these differing perspectives, we need to explore the history of
the statute and its use in federal courts today.
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) hails from the Judiciary Act
of 1789, one of the provisions not struck down by John Marshall's court
68 See id. at 423.
69 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
70 Doe v. Unocal Corp., supra note 4, at 890.
71 Zia-Zafiri, supra note 16, at 84, 86.
72 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING THE
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 1, 7, 37-48 (2003).
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in Marbury v. Madison.73 Its history is so arcane and purpose so hazy
that Judge Friendly labeled the Act a "legal Lohengrin" as "no one
seem[ed] to know whence it came., 74 The Act lay dormant for nearly
two centuries until the Second Circuit revived it in the 1980 case
Filartiga v. Irala-Pena,75 starting the modem usage of the Act by
allowing foreigners access to U.S. federal courts to seek redress for
human rights abuses that took place outside the U.S. 76 In Filartiga, Dr.
Joel Filartiga, a citizen of Paraguay, filed suit against Americo Norberto
Pena-Irala (Pena), also a citizen of Paraguay, and accused him of
kidnapping, torturing, and killing Dr. Filartiga's son as revenge for his
father's opposition to the government. Dr. Filartiga was unable to pursue
his claim in the Paraguayan court system,77 so he sued under the little
used ATCA. Since Pena was the Inspector General of Police in
Asuncion, Paraguay, he could be held liable as a state actor under the
customary rules of international law.
The Filartiga decision contains two significant holdings. The
first concerned how the court was to interpret the meaning of a violation
of international law under the Act - either in light of what the First
Congress itself believed constituted a violation of international law in
1789, which would limit the kinds of claims an alien could bring into
federal courts, or contemporaneously, thus allowing federal courts
jurisdiction over practically all violations of international law. 78 The
Second Circuit chose the latter, stating, "the law of nations forms an
integral part of the common law, and a review of the history surrounding
73 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
74 ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1978); from the Wagner
opera "Lohengrin," where Lohengrin the Swan must leave his love Elsa because
he has been imbued with mystical powers by the Grail, and those powers can
only be maintained if their nature is kept secret.
75 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
76 LINDA A. WILLET, et al, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 5 (National Legal Center for the Public
Interest ed., 2003).
77 Filartiga's lawyer was arrested and threatened with death while chained to a
wall at police headquarters, and then later was disbarred without cause.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
78 WILLET, et al., supra note 76, at 7.
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the adoption of the Constitution demonstrates that it became a part of the
common law of the United States upon the adoption of the
Constitution."7 9  In other words, the court decided to interpret
international law not as it existed in 1789, but as it exists among the
nations of the present. A "jus cogens" violations of international law,
therefore, would grant the federal courts jurisdiction over an ATCA case.
The second holding concerned the jurisdictional nature of the
statute. Although the Filartiga Court maintained that it was only
"opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already
recognized by international law," 80 its practical effect was to create a
new private right of action for aliens. For Mr. Filartiga these two
holdings meant that he could properly bring Pena to task under the
ATCA because torture was defined as being a violation of international
law at the time of his claim.
The evolution of modem ATCA cases continued in Doe v.
Karadzic81 where the court expanded its subject matter jurisdiction under
the Act to include the actions of non-state actors.82 In Karadzic, Bosnian
Croats and Muslims brought suit against Radovan Karadzic, president of
the so-called Bosnian-Serb Republic of Srpska, for atrocities committed
by him and his followers with aid from Yugoslav officials during the
Bosnian war. The district court initially threw the case out for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction - Srpska was not a legally recognized state,
which meant Karadzic and his followers could not have been acting
"under the color of any recognized state law" despite Yugoslav aid. 83 As
non-state actors, they therefore could not be held liable for violations of
international law. 4
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's
reasoning, calling Srpska's lack of statehood immaterial when what
mattered was whether Karadzic and his followers violated well-
established norms of international law.85 The court thus maneuvered
79 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886.80 Id. at 887.
81 866 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Kadic vKaradzic, 70 F. 3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
82 WILLET, et al., supra note 76, at 13.
83 Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 741.
84Id. at 740-741.
85 Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245.
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around the non-state actor obstacle by extending liability to individual
actors regardless of their official connection to a state if they engage in
genocidal activities "together with state officials or with significant state
aid."'86 Karadzic therefore set the stage for targeting MNCs under the
Act. If an MNC acts with the state or with its aid, U.S. courts may hold
them liable under the ATCA for violations of human rights. As the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to Karadzic, the Second Circuit's
conclusions represented reliable precedent for ATCA litigation against
MNCs.
87
The most famous of the ATCA cases against MNCs, and the one
that made it the farthest along in the litigation process, is Doe v. Unocal
Corp.88 In Unocal, Burmese refugees accused the oil giant Unocal of
subsidizing the ruling military elite's egregious violations of human
rights for the benefit of Unocal in its construction of the Yadana
pipeline. 89 The allegations included acts of murder and rape, forced
relocation, use of slave labor, and the destruction of Burmese villagers'
homes and properties. 90 Unocal motioned to dismiss for three main
reasons: first, it claimed the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; 91
second, Unocal argued that its actions in Burma could not be categorized
as state action, therefore the ATCA could not apply; 92 and third, that the
litigation would breach the act of state doctrine by interfering with
American foreign policy. 93  But the Unocal court rejected these
arguments, finding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction under
the ATCA,94 that even private parties could be held accountable for
violations of international law,95 and that since the U.S. government had
already denounced the new Burmese government, court adjudication
86 Id.
87 Zia-Zarifi, supra note 16, at 93.
88 Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
89 Id. at 885.
90 Id. at 883.
9' Id. at 885-886.
92 Id. at 890.
9' Id. at 892.
94 Id. at 891.
95 Id.
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over the matter could hardly make foreign relations worse.96 The court's
decision allowed the plaintiffs to begin discovery in preparation for trial,
but before trial could begin, the Ninth Circuit reversed for further
97 98considerations.97 Although the parties eventually settled out of court,
Unocal showed that if alien plaintiffs could allege sufficient facts
showing that an MNC violated international law when acting in concert
with a state, the case could be brought under the ATCA in federal courts.
Despite the supposed success of the Unocal litigation, serious
deficiencies exist which should give ATCA plaintiffs pause. Brevity
may be a virtue, but the language of the Act lacks many of the technical
and procedural components that characterize modern legislation. First,
the Act lacks a statute of limitations. How much time does a plaintiff
have to bring an ATCA action? Ten years, like under the Torture
Victims Protection Act?99 Or much longer, say back to World War II?00
So far, there is no apparent consensus among the Circuits.10 Next, the
Act does not require that a plaintiff exhaust all available remedies at
home before filing in U.S. federal courts, as international law normally
requires. Instead, the plaintiff in an ATCA action does not have to
plead exhaustion of all remedies as a condition precedent to invoke the
jurisdictional authority of the federal courts.
96 Id. at 893.
97 Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
98 EarthRights International, supra note 5.
99 See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 72, at 11. Companion legislation
to the ATCA, the TVPA is codified under 28 U.S.C. §1350, n.2 (2003).
Originally passed in 1992, it allows alien and U.S. citizen plaintiffs to bring an
action against any individual acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation." The TVPA includes a 10-year statute of
limitations, which the Ninth Circuit has instituted for ATCA litigation. Papa v.
U.S., 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002); reaffirmed in Deutsch v. Tuner Corp., 317
F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).
'00 With holocaust victims or their relatives still alive today, a very long statute
of limitations could conceivably create another judicial avenue to pursue
corporations accused of aiding and abetting the Nazi state.
101 HUFBAUER, supra note 72, at 11. The ninth circuit chose a 10-year statute of





Another problem that supporters of ATCA rarely mention is the
Act's potential impact on international trade and American foreign
relations. Tort litigation in the U.S. could result in large awards for the
plaintiffs, and ATCA suits have the real possibility of depressing
international trade by billions of dollars per year and putting thousands
of American manufacturing jobs at risk. 0 3 For the developing nations
that need MNC investment for their economies, ATCA suits could curtail
their trading ability, investment opportunities and access to credit.104
Additionally, ATCA has the potential to affect American foreign
relations.' 5 For example, in Unocal one of the original four defendants
was Total, S.A., a French oil firm, later dismissed from the case for lack
of personal jurisdiction. 0 6 If the court had not dismissed Total and had
the plaintiffs won judgment against Total, the Unocal court would have
in effect passed judgment on a French firm for acts conducted outside the
United States. Such a result reeks of judicial imperialism and comes into
conflict with the powers of the executive branch, the only branch with
the constitutional power to conduct foreign policy.
To counter some of this criticism (and most likely to lessen the
number of potential suits), the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an
ATCA case - Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.107 In Sosa, a Mexican national
sued his kidnapper and fellow Mexican, alleging that the 24-hour
detention he experienced in Mexico before being shipped across the
border to face charges for murdering a DEA agent, violated his human
rights.108 Sosa's main defense was that as a solely jurisdictional statute,
the Act created no new causes of action as it merely vested federal courts
with jurisdiction. 0 9 The Court agreed, concluding that the ATCA could
apply only to the three violations of international law applicable in 1789:
offenses against ambassadors, violations of "safe conducts," and
individual actions arising out of prize capture and piracy." 0  This
'0' Id. at 37-40.
1
04 Id. at 42.
'o5 Id. at 45.
106 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
107 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
108 Id. at 698.
109 Id. at 711-12.
"0 Id. at 724.
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essentially repudiated the Filartiga court's holding that violations of
international law could be found viewing international law in a modem
light. In sum, Sosa cleared up some issues, but left others mired in
ambiguity, especially the future of ATCA litigation against MNCs.
The Court's holding in Sosa, however, did not completely close
the door on modem ATCA suits. The Court stated that in the future,
district courts "should require any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th century paradigms we have recognized."' 1l This does not
seem to overturn any of the previous ATCA cases, but merely ensures
that when courts grant jurisdiction, they are doing so because there has
been a violation of international law with "specificity comparable" to the
First Congress's intent. However, the Supreme Court did not provide
any further guidance on when a violation would be sufficiently
comparable. Although a jus cogens violation will probably suffice for
future cases, anything less may be insufficient to invoke the
jurisdictional power of the U.S. courts.
IV. NORMS ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD
TO HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UN'S ATTEMPT TO CREATE A BINDING
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT
Robert F. Gorman has characterized the subject of human rights
and MNCs as one of the fifty great debates in the United Nations.
12
During the 1970's, the UN realized that the growth of MNC annual sales
capacities had become so large as to exceed the GNPs of many
developing nations. The potential influence the MNCs could have on the
economic health of host countries and the global economy goaded the
UN into action as they sought a way to regulate the growing power of the
MNCs." 3 In 1972, an official UN action on the matter began when the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) asked the Secretary General to
appoint a group of knowledgeable persons to study the impact that the
... Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
112 GORMAN, supra note 12, at 242.
"' See id. at 243-44.
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MNCs had on the world economy." 4 The group concluded that MNCs
should be studied and possibly regulated by the UN. Subsequently in
1974, ECOSOC resolved to establish a Commission on Transnational
Corporations (Commission) as a forum within the UN system for
consideration of issues relating to MNCs.1 5  One of its first tasks
included the creation of a binding international code of conduct for
VNCs. 
1 16
The Commission's efforts to create such a code, however,
became mired in the strange, post-World War II interaction between
communism, de-colonization and globalization. These three interlocking
influences effectively destroyed the Commission's ability to create a
code. First, the Soviet Union, being obviously anti-capitalist,
enthusiastically pushed the code; they saw it as a means to contain
Western economic influence and power as embodied in the emerging
phenomenon of globalization.'l 7 Second, the 1960's and 1970's finally
saw the end of hundreds of years of colonial rule by Western powers.
18
The newly de-colonized nations, practically all third-world, developing
nations, perceived the MNCs as agents of their home countries and
retaliated by expropriating foreign investment through a program of
nationalizing concessions held by these MNCs. 119 When they refused to
compensate the MNCs for their expropriated investments, the UN
endorsed the de-colonized nations' position. 20  That, in turn, veered
Western countries from any idea of placing a binding, UN sponsored
code on their corporations. Further, as de-colonized nations and Eastern
Europe dominated the Commission, a UN sponsored code had no chance
to reach a consensus with capitalist Western Nations. By 1992, the
deadlock caused the Commission to abandon work on the code. 121
"14 E.S.C Res. 1721 (LIII), U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3 (1972).
115 OSMANCZYK, supra note 18, at 1496.
116id.
117 See GORMAN, supra note 12, at 243, 245.
118 Ratner, supra note 19, at 454-55.
"9 See id. at 455-56.
12o See e.g., G.A. 3281, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
121 OSMANCZYK, supra note 18, at 1496.
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The fall of Communism in the beginning of the 1990's and the
realization by developing nations that MNCs could be effective tools for
their own economies turned the Commission's attitude around.
ECOSOC recommended that the Commission be inserted into the
institutional machinery of the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and given a new title: Commission on
International Investment and Transnational Corporations.' 22  The
function of the new commission changed to suit the new attitude - no
longer trying to regulate MNCs, it instead focused on boosting
governmental, intergovernmental and NGO efforts to encourage private
sector investment in developing nations. 123 Yet the goal of creating a
binding code of conduct for MNCs remained; and in August 2003 the
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights introduced the Norms on
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights ("Norms").
124
The Norms, a truly singular document with big aspirations,
begins with the recognition that "[s]tates have the primary responsibility
to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national
law."' 125 Yet within their "spheres of activity and influence, transnational
corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to
promote ...and protect human rights" according to international and
national norms. 126 The Norms does not grant parity to the MNCs as to
the state, but it does not let the MNC off the hook if any of its actions are
not in accordance to international law. The Norms also make very clear
to the MNC that it is legally binding and all provisions within are
mandatory. 27 Paragraphs B through G outline the obligations that are
specific to MNCs: right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory
treatment; right to security of persons; rights of workers; respect for
122 GORMAN, supra note 12, at 246.
123 id.
124 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of the Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
125 Id. at pt. A.
126 Id.
127 See generally id.
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national sovereignty and human rights; obligations with regard to
consumer protection; and obligations with regard to environmental
protection. 128  MNCs must also "adopt, disseminate and implement
internal rules of operations in compliance with these Norms,"'12 9 and the
Norms notify MNCs that they "shall be subject to periodic monitoring
and verification by the United Nations, other international and national
mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created." 130 There is even a
provision for MNCs to make adequate reparations to persons, entities, or
communities that are adversely affected by an MNC's failure to comply
with the Norms.'
3'
The Norms as a public international code has several advantages.
First, as a part of the body of international law, states must observe the
code's provisions. 132 Second, as a single, across the board consistent
standard, it "levels the playing field" between MNCs that have codes and
those that do not. Since all MNCs must have codes that implement the
provisions of the Norms, no MNC can have a competitive advantage
over another because all MNCs have to bear the cost of implementing
such a code. 33 Finally, an international standard would remove any
question of what kind of behavior is acceptable for MNCs.
Although the Norms represents the culmination of 30 years of
UN effort to exert some sort of control over the activities of MNCs, the
reaction of the international community (including developing countries)
has been less than enthusiastic. The International Chamber of
Commerce ("ICC"), the ICC's American branch, and the International
Organization of Employers ("OE") all opposed the Norms due to its
legalistic approach and enforceability.' 34 Developing countries disliked
the Norms as well because it imposed upon the countries obligations to
28 Id. at pts. B-G.
2 9 Id. at para. 15.
130 Id. at para. 16.
131 Id. at para. 18.
132 Wawryk, supra note 25, at 58.
133 Id.
134 Julie Campagna, United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the
Global Rule Makers, 37 J. Marshall L.Rev. 1205, 1207-08 (2004).
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monitor MNCs themselves and report periodically to the UN, the costs of
which the developing countries did not want to bear. 3 5 Finally, even
important branches of the UN will not endorse the code. The
Commission on Human Rights, after taking note of the Norms, stated
that because the Norms had not been requested by the Commission on
Human Rights, it had no legal standing.' 36 The Commission on Human
Rights' ruling essentially rendered the Norms dead in the water, thereby
removing any chance that the Norms could become part of the body of
international law.
CONCLUSION
The corporate codes of conduct, the ATCA suits, and even the
Norms, have attributes that could prevent or remedy MNC violations of
international law, but in their present incarnations, they cannot
themselves work to create an environment where MNCs and the public
will not have to worry about such violations. The key is not only
strengthening these measures, but also integrating them to create a
system with redundant safeguards. Here are some thoughts on how to
make these systems work for the better, both individually and jointly.
First, let us examine the corporate codes of conduct. If an MNC is
serious about preventing human rights violations, then a corporate code
of conduct represents an excellent starting point. An MNC can tailor a
code specific to its industry and its own needs. The overwhelming
problem with MNC codes, however, is that they are voluntary, making it
difficult to hold MINCs to their promises, especially if outside monitoring
is lacking. As such, MNCs need an incentive not only to adopt a code,
but to keep to it. One possible incentive comes from domestic corporate
law, where a corporation can reduce its liability for violations of its duty
of care if the corporate directors institute a reasonable monitoring system
that can alert them to any material events!'37 Under this concept, when
the corporation has instituted reasonable internal monitoring systems, the
company incurs no liability for any violation as long as they are not
systematic or particularly egregious. If a similar system was to be
135 Wawryk, supra note 25, at 59.
136 Murphy, supra note 27, at 408.




applied to MNC codes of conduct, then MNC liability under the ATCA
could be reduced (although not totally eliminated because these are
human rights abuses) if the MNC has instituted a reasonable code of
conduct for preventing abuses in operations abroad. In such a system,
the more specific code gives the MNC protection by keeping away large
damage awards.
As for the ATCA, it is hard to be enthusiastic about using a
statute that has yet to produce results on the merits. 38 Even in Unocal,
which remained on the judicial docket for nearly a decade, the parties
settled out of court.' 3 9 Also, no country has an even remotely equivalent
statute comparable to the Act.' 40 While some see that distinction as
proof that the United States is willing to envision innovative steps to
protect human rights and willing to prod other civilized countries in the
same direction, 14 1 others think it a dubious distinction because it merely
shows that the United States is playing way out in left field.
42
Despite all of the problems associated with the Act and the
ambiguities created by the Supreme Court in Sosa, it could still be an
effective tool for punishing MNCs while not creating the plausible
commercial, international and judicial nightmare. First, responsibility
would go to Congress to fill in the gaps of the Act, like the statute of
limitations and exhaustion of local remedies. Because the TVPA is a
companion act to the ATCA and already has such provisions, the easiest
thing Congress could do is apply them to the ATCA. Congress should
138 The Business and Human Rights Centre, http://www.business-
humanrights.org, keeps an updated list of all ATCA cases currently on the
docket and has an excellent archive covering ATCA litigation. A lengthy review
of the cases listed on the website failed to turn up a single case that had made it
completely through the process to be decided on the merits.
139 Duncan Campbell, Energy Giant Agrees [to] Settlement with Burmese
Villagers, THE GAURDIAN UNLIMITED,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/O,,1373704,00.html (last visited
February 27, 2006). Unocal did settle though, which means the Burmese
refugees received some compensation for the horrors visited upon them because
of the construction of the Yadana.
140 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 72, at 46.
141 Zia-Zarifi, supra note 16, at 84.
142 See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 72.
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also limit which corporations can be brought to task under the Act,
namely only those MNCs incorporated in the U.S.. Such a bright-line
rule avoids the potential foreign relations faux pas of holding a non-
American company liable for an act committed outside the U.S. territory.
All these measures would ensure that only serious, recognizable
violations of international law by American-based MNCs would make it
into federal courts under the ATCA.
Yet Congress and the Supreme Court should not worry too much
about the number of cases brought under the Act spinning out of control.
As the Court held in Sosa, a plaintiff will need to allege either a violation
of international law that is of a "specificity comparable" to the 18th
Century conception of that term (offenses against ambassadors,
violations of "safe conducts," and individual actions arising out of prize
capture and piracy) or a "jus cogens" violation.143 Because an MNC
would be hard pressed to violate any one of the three 18th Century
violations, only a "jus cogens" violation will be actionable.
Finally, there is the dead-on-arrival Norms. The UN should
abandon any kind of effort to create a mandatory code of conduct. The
chances of agreement between developing and developed countries (even
between developed countries themselves) will not be coming soon. Nor
will developed countries allow their corporations to be controlled by
anyone but themselves and the countries in which the corporations
operate. Instead, the UN should focus on pushing nations to follow
guidelines like the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Developments' ("OECD") Guidelines) 44
The OECD Guidelines outline a standard of behavior that MNCs
should follow when operating in countries that adhere to them. 45 The
Guidelines include provisions that are very general, 46 usually a sign of a
weak code, but it covers a wide spectrum of topics - such as the duty to
143 Sosa, supra note 107, at 2761-62.
144 OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (4th ed. 2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited
February 27, 2006).
141 Id. at 5.
146 For example, number 2 of the "General Policies" section of the OECD
Guidelines states that MNCs must "[r]espect the human rights of those affected
by their activities consistent with the host government's international obligations
and commitments." Id. at 19.
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disclose, provisions on employment and industrial relations, the
environment, combating bribery, even consumer interest and taxation -
making it comprehensive. The Guidelines, however, are not meant to
substitute or override the applicable law of a nation; they merely
supplement it.147 That removes a major obstacle experienced by the
Norms. In addition, labor and corporate groups participated in the
making of the Guidelines, so it has earned greater support from both as a
result. 48 Its only weaknesses are its voluntary nature and the lack of
participation in the OECD by developing nations.1 49 The Guidelines,
however, with their comprehensive provisions and popular support,
represent a good alternative for the UN to explore, rather than further
attempting to create a binding, international code of conduct.
Another avenue that the UN could explore would be the
possibility of giving developing nations monetary incentives to create or
enforce their own legislation that will protect their citizens. As
mentioned earlier in this paper, developing nations often do not have the
infrastructure available to police the MNCs operating in their
countries.' 50 The UN could therefore look for ways to help these nations
create the necessary legal infrastructure to protect human rights by
finding them money to do so. The UN could also look to lowering these
countries' debt, or get them access to greater credit if they do create or
enforce domestic human rights legislation. Instead of trying to have
overall authority on human rights, the UN should move the world as best
it can to get there on its own.
In all, corporations, the U.S. federal courts, and the UN are
moving in the right direction. They just need a little prodding to achieve
the goal of a world free from human rights abuses committed by
multinational corporations.
147 Id. at 5.
148 Murphy, supra note 27, at 410.
149 Ratner, supra note 19, at 536.
150 Pillay, supra note 11, at 501.
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